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Enhancing Environmental Governance for
Sustainable Development: Function-Oriented Options
by John E. Scanlon
The 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, is likely to determine the future direction of the institutional framework for sustainable development and for
international environmental governance. As states move toward the “sharp end” of their negotiations, it is important to analyze some of the risks and benefits of the identified options for the
reform of international environmental governance and offer pragmatic ideas on how to make
best use of existing resources and structures.

“…there is general agreement
that: the international
environmental governance
system is not adequately
fulfilling its objectives and
functions … and the status quo
is not an option.”

In the current intergovernmental debates on the institutional framework for sustainable
development, the environmental dimension is the subject of particular attention. More
specifically, there is general agreement that: the international environmental governance
system is not adequately fulfilling its objectives and functions; environmental governance
reform should be addressed in the broader context of environmental sustainability and sustainable development; and the status quo is not an option.
Governments have developed ideas for institutional redesign over the past twenty years.
They launched the latest rounds of negotiations, the so-called Belgrade Process, at the
twenty-fifth session of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Governing
Council in 2009, followed by a decision to continue the process in 2010.1 The overall process
resulted in a set of reform options regarding form and function, which are outlined in the
Belgrade Process “Set of options for improving international environmental governance”
and the “Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome” documents and include:2
a. Enhancing UNEP
b. Establishing a new umbrella organization for sustainable development
c. Establishing a specialized agency such as a world environment organization
d. Reforming the United Nations Economic and Social Council and the United
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
e. Enhancing institutional reforms and streamlining existing structures
These options differ in the specific institutional structures that would be established or
modified. Options (a) and (c) focus specifically on the environmental governance architecture, through UNEP or a successor organization. The other options address the wider sustainable development architecture, which is beyond the scope of this issue brief. Regardless of any changes in the wider architecture, one of the two UNEP-related options may
be adopted at the upcoming United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
2012, commonly known as “Rio+20.”3 These two options will differ in several respects,
including: their negotiating tracks; the effort required to implement the negotiated
outcome; and how the United Nations (UN) system addresses the environment.
However, the structural and procedural differences between the options do not fully
encapsulate the range of functional issues which reform should address. Functional
objectives are outlined in the Belgrade Process outcome; the ability of an enhanced
UNEP or successor organization to meet these objectives will depend not only
on which option is chosen, but on a range of architectural features, in particular
the entity’s relationship with other bodies such as the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World
Trade Organization (WTO), and the diverse multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Such architectural details need to be discussed and decided
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with their objectives in mind. As originally agreed when the
current governance architecture was established in 1972, “form
should follow function.”4 This brief examines the links between
structural reform and functional outcomes. It presents an overview of the procedural and structural differences between the
two UNEP-related reform options and offers some ideas on enabling a reformed institutional architecture to meet its functional objectives.

Common to both options is that they will require a negotiated
outcome between states. States will determine the mandate,
authority, and financing of any institutional form that is adopted. Such negotiations could occur directly or indirectly within
the UNGA, or outside of it.

Specialized Agency
The rationale often stated for creating a specialized agency is
to use 21st-century institutional models to respond to 21stcentury challenges, and to achieve equivalency with other entities such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) (est.
1919), World Bank (est. 1944), Food and Agriculture Organization (est. 1945), UNESCO (est. 1946), World Health Organization
(est. 1948), and World Trade Organization (est. 1995).

Reform of Institutional Structure: Specialized
Agency vs. Subsidiary Body
The two main institutional alternatives under political consideration include a specialized agency of the UN, such as a World
Environment Organisation (WEO) or a UN Environment Organisation (UNEO5), or an enhanced UNEP, which would retain
its current status as a subsidiary body of the UNGA. The two alternatives differ in the legal instruments of their creation, their
level of independence, their relationship with the rest of the
UN system, as well as their membership and funding sources.
Some of these differences are summarized in the table below,
and others are discussed further below.

The governance of the specialized agency would be determined through its negotiation process, which would result in
the adoption of a treaty, and its relationship to the UN would
be determined by Article 57 of the UN Charter. A specialized
agency would not fall under the authority of the UNGA or the
UN programmatic or budgetary processes, and would have to
create its own administrative regulations and rules (or explic-

Specialized Agency

Subsidiary Entity of UNGA

Legal
instrument

Specific treaty negotiated between states under
the auspices of the UNGA or independently
thereof

UNGA resolution (to establish or modify
a subsidiary body), e.g., Resolution 2997
establishing UNEP

Membership

Open to all states but dependent on their
ratification of the organization’s treaty.
Universal membership is possible (and is an
aspiration) but cannot be guaranteed1

Universal membership through the UNGA,
although membership of its governing body
may be universal or limited, e.g., UNEP Governing
Council (GC), which currently has 58 members

Recent
examples

United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) with 173 State Parties,
created in 19852; outside the UN system, the
International Renewable Energy Agency, with
75 State Parties (and the EU), was created
in 2009

UN Women, created in 2010; UN Human Rights
Council, created in 2006. Neither entity has a
governing body with universal membership

Funding

Usually through assessed contributions from
member states; no funding from regular UN
budget

Some funding from UN regular budget (for
example, 4% of UNEP’s current budget plus
direct and indirect support through the UN
Office of Nairobi (UNON)3; most funding is
currently voluntary

Individual states may or may not be party to an organization’s treaty, and historically have sometimes even withdrawn from and later rejoined
some organizations.
2
Interestingly, UNIDO was originally established in 1966 as “an organ of the UNGA” and functioned as an “autonomous organization,”
although this has not been repeated.
3
Approximately US$6 million per year. UNEP’s administrative costs are also reduced through direct and indirect administrative support from
UNON, e.g., support for meetings of the Governing Council, security, etc., the precise value of which has not been fully calculated, but direct
regular budget support may be between US$10-20 million per year (UNON).
1

2

“…the ability of an enhanced UNEP or successor organization to meet these objectives
will depend not only on which option is chosen, but on a range of architectural features…
Such architectural details need to be discussed and decided with their objectives in mind”
Some Significant Changes since the Establishment
of UNEP in 1972

itly adopt UNGA regulations and rules). It would be an authority unto itself, and would not need any further approval to either take or implement decisions within its mandate, which is
a defining feature of this option. However, if the agency has less
than universal membership, this will have implications for its
financing and perceived authority.

Membership of the UN has grown from 132 states in 1972 to
193 in 2011 (the UNEP Governing Council still comprises 58
states, as in 1972 – 44% of total UNGA membership in 1972
but 30% in 2012). Membership in multilateral environmental agreements has also grown dramatically, as illustrated in
Figure 1.

While reference is often made to the “upgrading of UNEP into a
specialized agency,” the creation of a specialized agency would
not in itself abolish UNEP. Since UNEP is a programme of the
UNGA, it would be for the General Assembly to determine the
fate of UNEP. Issues such as these would need to be resolved
through the negotiation process.

Environment ministries and related portfolios have been
created across all countries.
There are now 500+ MEAs, although most of these are regional
agreements, such as river basin management organizations.
In discussing international environmental governance, we
are primarily concerned with the approximately 12-15 global
MEAs with universal – or near universal – membership: UNFCCC, UNCCD, CBD, and Montreal Protocol have 192+ parties; WHC 182 parties; CITES 175 parties; etc. Most of these
(but not all) hold meetings of the Conferences of the Parties
(COP) every two years.

Subsidiary Body of the UN General Assembly
Whether UNEP is retained and enhanced, or re-created, there
is wide scope available to the UNGA for the specific governance
structure it establishes for a subsidiary entity, as is evident from
a review of existing entities such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNITAR,
UNAIDS, the Human Rights Council, UN Women – or UNIDO
as it existed under the UNGA prior to becoming a specialized
agency. The 58-member UNEP Governing Council could be expanded, for instance, or some of its responsibilities reassigned.

New financial mechanisms have been established, most importantly the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with 182
State parties, and the Multilateral Fund under the Montreal
Protocol, with 196 parties.

The UNGA can enable an entity to address matters within its
competence without further approval by the UNGA, and can
prescribe the voting process of the entity, or leave it to the entity itself to determine. It can also empower a subsidiary entity
to create its own rules and to further expand on relevant UN
rules, including human resources policies, provided they are
consistent with the UNGA-approved regulations. Such an entity would, however, remain under the general authority of the
UNGA.

Environment is built into the programs of multiple UN and
other international entities, such as the World Bank, INTERPOL, WTO, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, etc. (42 in total).
Civil society involvement has blossomed, with major NGOs
such as Conservation International, the Nature Conservancy, and WWF having multimillion-dollar budgets, and NGOs
collectively having billion-dollar budgets.
The private sector is engaged with and investing in environmental issues, including through industry associations and
fora such as the World Economic Forum.

A subsidiary entity of the UN has a direct relationship with the
UN and its other subsidiary bodies, and is linked to the wider
sustainable development agenda, including through the review
of its budget and program by processes established for most UN
funds and programmes (noting that all exclusively voluntarily
funded entities are excluded from the UNGA Committee on Programme and Coordination6). It would also remain open to the
UNGA to further modify the mandate of a subsidiary body over
time by resolution as necessary, as has occurred with UNEP.

There are new environmental challenges and emerging opportunities: population growth, changing consumption and
production patterns, advances in the technology available
for exploiting nature as well as for its rehabilitation, etc.

Figure 1. Number of Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements.
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library
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Proposals for Reform

a) Creating a strong, credible, and accessible
science base and policy interface

While the focus of the current debate is on institutional form,
simply choosing one of the options will not in itself resolve all
the pertinent needs of a new environmental governance regime or entity. For instance, the cross-cutting nature of the environment – both thematically and through the broad range of
tools used to address environmental issues – is such that any
new entity’s relationship with a wide range of other bodies is
critical. For example:

Proposal: The current UNEP Global Environment Outlook
(GEO) process could be enhanced to provide a broad-based
“landscape view” of the environmental science base and policy
platform. The process could draw upon the contribution made
through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and (in the future) by the Intergovernmental Platform
for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) to the science
base and policy interface, as well as the environmental analysis of many bodies within and outside of the UN system. This
enhancement would be in line with the mandate for GEO-5,
which now includes a more explicit policy component.

For national-level capacity building, the relationship with
UNDP (among others) is essential.
For better connecting high-level policy advice with financing for the environment, the relationship with the GEF and
the World Bank is essential, including in setting priorities for
financing.

The cycle of adopting and publishing GEO could coincide with
the three- to four-yearly meetings of the governing body of the
new Environment entity (see below), giving substance to the
meetings of the governing body and providing a compass for
setting financing and programmatic directions.

For the effective implementation of decisions of a crosssectoral nature, an interrelationship with entities as diverse
as the FAO, ILO, WHO, WMO, INTERPOL, UNODC, WCO,
WTO, OECD, the World Economic Forum, and the International Tropical Timber Organization, etc., is required.

In addition to influencing financing priorities, the adoption of
the GEO could be timed to enable it to inform the development
of strategies for the relevant replenishment cycle of the GEF.
And in order to help set system-wide programmatic priorities,
it could facilitate the development or review of a UN systemwide plan for the environment (see below).

As the lead entity for the environmental dimension of sustainable development, interaction with the UNGA, ECOSOC
and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) (or
its successor) is required.
For effective and coherent implementation of the core
MEAs, a programmatic interrelationship with MEAs addressing biodiversity, hazardous substances (chemicals and
waste), and climate change, etc. will be critical.

b) Developing a global authoritative and responsive
voice for environmental sustainability
Proposal: Universal membership of the governing body of the
environmental entity could be instituted to give it greater political legitimacy, particularly during an era where MEAs and
financing mechanisms have universal, or near-universal, membership. Similarly, it could link agenda and priority-setting for
financing and systemwide planning to the adoption of major
scientific reports and policy statements in order to increase responsiveness and scientific legitimacy.

These interrelationships cannot be directly resolved through
the negotiation of an UNGA resolution or a treaty. For example,
any formal interrelationship among the MEAs will need to be
negotiated with each of the respective COPs, where parties will
sometimes differ – as they will with other entities, and in particular those not falling under the authority of the UNGA, such
as the GEF.

However, a distinction must be drawn between the authoritative voice that sets the global agenda, and the management
oversight function, which can be served by a smaller management board to provide effective oversight of the secretariat.
There is also a need for a secretariat that can work effectively
across the UN system, which may require a strong voice and
presence in UN Headquarters in New York.

Any reform could address these details, and seek to fulfill the
desired objectives of the UN system, regardless of which institutional form is ultimately adopted. The five objectives identified in the Belgrade Process document serve as a good way
of identifying possible specific reforms aimed at achieving this
end. In assessing these options, therefore, reference is made to
“the new Environment entity” as a neutral term.

The new Environment entity governing body could have universal membership and meet once every three to four years7 in
Nairobi to:

At the core of these possible reforms is the need for a more
authoritative, accountable, and cost-effective entity, one that
is better able to connect science with policy and policy with
financing, can enhance more coherent and effective implementation efforts, and can provide meaningful direction and guidance to the entire UN system and beyond. They are also about
making a shift from an era characterized by international negotiations to one focused on national implementation.

Adopt GEO on a three- to four-yearly cycle – after an intergovernmental process.
Formally transmit GEO to the UNGA, CSD (or its successor),
the World Bank, GEF, etc. as setting out agreed global environment priorities.
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“In addition to being an authoritative voice, the new Environment entity
could direct its energy toward programmatic coherence at global and
regional levels and support of national-level implementation…”
Review the outcomes of MEA COPs (voluntary outcome
reports could be submitted by MEAs through their secretariats), consider issues of common interest, determine how
to facilitate and support national implementation of COP
decisions, and assess gaps and appropriate measures to fill
them.

and the new Environment entity could have a modus operandi
that is closer to that of the EMG. The EMG could come under
the direct authority of the UN Chief Executives Board, in a similar fashion to the UN Development Group, and be chaired by
the executive head of the new Environment entity (currently
chaired by UNEP). The Biodiversity Liaison Group (comprising the executive heads of six biodiversity-related conventions)
could be restructured to come under the EMG, while still also
reporting on its activities to relevant COPs. Similar groups
could be established for the other thematic clusters of MEAs,
as appropriate.

Convene the Presidents/Chairs of MEA governing bodies, as
well as their executive heads, and make recommendations
to forthcoming MEA COPs on enhancing national implementation, including through joint actions.
Monitor UN and MEA financing, capacity building, and
technology-transfer efforts for the environment.

The new Environment entity could have a Nairobi-based executive head at Under-Secretary-General (USG) level (as is the case
with UNEP), a New York Office, and a representative office in
Geneva at levels that reflect the significance of these offices,
namely, with leaders at the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG)
level and D2 level, respectively. Locating the new Environment
entity in Nairobi would build upon existing human resources
and physical infrastructure.

Review state compliance with environmental commitments
on a purely voluntary basis – with states that submit to a
voluntary review being eligible for additional financial support, including through the GEF, to enable them to come
into compliance as necessary.
Support state-to-state capacity building and technologytransfer efforts on the basis of north-north, south-south,
north-south, and south-north cooperation.

In addition to being an authoritative voice, the new Environment entity could direct its energy toward programmatic coherence at global and regional levels and support of nationallevel implementation, with a strong regional programmatic
presence and selected liaison offices, but no permanent country programmatic presence. It could take the lead in addressing
regional environmental initiatives and connecting to regional
processes, while programmatic county presence could be
served by UNDP or other appropriate entities. The new entity
and UNDP could jointly fund and recruit environmental specialists to enhance country-level implementation of environmental commitments through UNDP country offices.

Convene a broad-based stakeholder forum on the environment and engage with such stakeholders in an open and interactive manner, as appropriate.
The governing body meeting could be timed to be back-toback with the GEF Assembly. The governing body could be
complemented by a management board of a limited number
of members (around 30 – the same as UNDP) established for
management oversight functions, which could meet twice a
year. Management board meetings could be held in Nairobi,
with one meeting being held in New York every one or two
years (noting UNICEF, UNDP, and UNFPA have an executive
board session in Geneva every second year). In addition, joint
sessions could be organized between UNDP’s governing board
and the Environment entity’s management board in New York
to address matters of common interest, and in particular national-level capacity building.8

The new Environment entity may be best served not administering any MEAs (noting that UNEP is, in essence, a UNON-administered Programme), which could be administered directly
by UNON and the UN Office at Geneva (UNOG) and report to
the relevant Director-General through the UN’s performanceappraisal system (ePAS) to ensure that delivery of the program
is in line with UN rules.

c) Achieving effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence within the United Nations system

The UN Secretary-General could be asked to amend the relevant UN rules as they apply to staff of all MEA secretariats, and
in particular to enable MEA COPs and subsidiary governance
bodies to have a more direct role in the recruitment of the executive head and in his/her performance appraisal on delivery
against the COP-approved work program.

Proposal: A UN systemwide plan for the environment could
be prepared to better align all parts of the UN system and others in working toward achieving results on agreed priorities. It
could be prepared by the UN Environment Management Group
(EMG) (membership includes all relevant UN entities as well
as major Global MEAs) and provide a common overarching
strategy and set of programmatic goals and targets.9 It could
be adopted by the governing body for the new Environment
entity every three to four years (see above) and be transmitted
to the UNGA. The EMG could also reach out to major intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and foundations to determine
how the efforts of the UN and such stakeholders could complement one another.

In response to calls to better streamline and coordinate MEA
administration,10 appropriate convention secretariats could be
clustered thematically, e.g., a chemicals and waste cluster secretariat. Such secretariats could be considered to service new
clusters of MEAs, with:
An atmosphere cluster secretariat to service the UNFCCC
and its protocol(s), and the Montreal Protocol and Multilateral Fund.

The Secretariat for the EMG could be formally brought within
the new Environment entity (at present it is notionally outside),
5

A biodiversity cluster secretariat to service the CBD and its
protocols, CITES, Ramsar, CMS and its protocols. Clustering could first be considered for the CITES and CMS Secretariats, two species-based conventions with a long history of
cooperation, and both located in Europe (Geneva and Bonn,
respectively).

World Bank and all other financing institutions as the primary
source of policy guidance on financing environmental initiatives, while the new entity could monitor all such financing and
make appropriate recommendations based on the GEO.
The Executive Director of the new Environment entity could
have a formal substantive role within the GEF governance
structure to provide advice on priority setting, based upon
GEO, as an ex-officio non-voting member of the Council. A
reciprocal arrangement with the new Environment entity’s
governing body could be considered for the CEO of the GEF. In
addition, the GEF Assembly could meet back to back with the
new Environment entity governing body, with one joint session
of both bodies. Meetings could alternate between Nairobi and
elsewhere for this purpose.

FAO ( food and food security) and UNESCO (cultural, natural, intangible, and movable heritage) already serve as clusters for the biodiversity-related MEAs they administer, and
hence the World Heritage Convention and International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
are not included in the biodiversity cluster.
Small nodes of specialist technical staff could be retained to
service the particular specialist needs of each convention,
similar to the arrangement for CBD protocols, with all other
administrative/ICT/finance services being centralized to
service the cluster.

e) Ensuring a responsive and cohesive approach
to meeting country needs
Proposal: UNDP could be clearly accepted as the lead entity
on national-level programmatic capacity-building for the environment, including for implementing the Bali Strategic Plan
for Capacity Building and Technology Support (BSP) (or its
successor), while the new Environment entity could be clearly
accepted as the lead in addressing regional programmatic environmental initiatives and connecting to regional processes,
with UNEP/UNDP staff being co-located in regional offices
where possible.

The biodiversity cluster MEAs could meet back-to-back and/or
simultaneously11 on a three-yearly COP cycle, with chemicals
and waste following a similar cycle – resulting in considerable
cost savings. In addition, reducing the number of COPs by moving away from two-yearly to three-yearly cycles (as is the case
with CITES) could help emphasize implementation rather than
negotiation.
UNON/UNOG could establish and offer common conference
services support to MEAs on a voluntary basis and with a financial incentive to participate. Climate negotiations could be
oriented around one location servicing permanent missions,
similar to the WTO.

The new Environment entity and MEAs could be mandated to
provide specialized, targeted national-level capacity-building
support in defined technical areas. The new Environment entity would not duplicate UNDP country offices, but work with
them in employing country-based environment specialist staff
(see above), and enhance its regional interrelationship and regional environmental leadership role.

The new Environment entity could be mandated to focus on
programmatic system-wide coherence,12 and support for national-level implementation of commitments/decisions taken
under MEAs – including raising the required resources, undertaking joint initiatives, and reinforcing links to sustainable development.

The new Environment entity’s management board and UNDP’s
Executive Board could hold joint annual or two-yearly sessions
in New York (see above) to address issues of common interest,
such as to approve and review environment work plans, including support to the United Nations Development Assistance
Framework (UNDAF) and National Biodiversity Strategy and
Action Plans (NBSAP) processes, etc., as well as adopt environmental capacity-building strategies.

d) Securing sufficient, predictable, and coherent
funding
Proposal: The GEF could become an environmental fund, delinked from the need for global environmental benefits, to better support national implementation efforts. The new criteria
could be the provision of funding for the national implementation of international commitments for the environment under
any global MEA13 – recognizing that a global convention by
definition must involve global benefits. Where funding is linked
to a state’s voluntary review of compliance with environmental
commitments (see above), it could be fast-tracked in order to
assist the state to come into compliance. The review could be
conducted under the authority of the new Environment entity.

UNDP/UNEP governing/management boards could convene
the nominees of the:
President and executive head of the CSD (or its successor)
and presidents/chairs/executive heads of key natural resources management agencies such as FAO, to participate in
joint sessions to address the links between capacity-building
needs for environment and sustainable development.
Presidents/Chairs of MEA governing bodies, as well as their
executive heads, and of IPCC and (proposed) IPBES, to participate in joint sessions to address the identified capacitybuilding needs of Parties under MEAs and how these can
be addressed through the environment workplans/NBSAP/

To ensure effective linkages between policy and financing, GEO
outcomes could be formally acknowledged by the GEF as the
primary source of advice on setting GEF strategies. The GEO
could also be formally transmitted by the governing body to the
6

UNDAF/capacity-building strategies to be developed and
approved by UNDP/UNEP.

development. Made in a personal capacity, these suggestions
represent some specific measures that could be considered, either individually or collectively, when further refining options
for international environmental governance reform.

Presidents and executive heads of major international organizations, NGOs, and foundations to determine how they can
complement one another in their capacity-building efforts.

Which of the major structural options currently under consideration, if any, governments choose depends on a number
of preferences, including the desired level of independence of
the new Environment entity. Articulating some of the risks and
benefits associated with the different options may help inform
the negotiations. Regardless of structural preferences, incorporating some of these proposals into any decisions made at
Rio+20 could help ensure that any changes make best use of
existing resources and structures in effectively fulfilling the
functional objectives identified through the Belgrade Process
outcome, recognizing that governance reform is ultimately a
means to an end, and not the end in itself.

Conclusion
Rio+20 is a moment in time when the direction of environmental governance for the decades ahead will be determined
– whether it be retaining the status quo, fundamental reform,
or something in between. Whatever direction is taken will have
significant implications for how States collectively address
both current and future sustainable development challenges
and opportunities.
This brief offers various ideas for practical reform as a contribution toward the current debate on environmental governance,
in the context of the institutional framework for sustainable
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Endnotes
UNEP 2010a.
UNEP 2009b, 2010b.
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The two options are included as alternatives (para. 51 and para. 51 alt.) in the Rio+20 zero-draft outcome document: UNCSD (2012). The
Future We Want. Zero-draft of the outcome document for consideration by member states and other stakeholders. 10 January 2012. Available at: www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/370The%20Future%20We%20Want%2010Jan%20clean%20_no%20brackets.pdf
4
Paragraph 7 of the Belgrade Process. UNEP (2009a).
5
A UNEO was originally put forward as a specialized agency. However, based on the precedent of UNIDO, it could be created instead as a
subsidiary entity of the UNGA (as UNEP is currently), despite being named an “Organization”; in that case, it would be akin to the latter,
enhanced-UNEP option.
6
Exclusively voluntarily funded, meaning receiving no regular budget. The Committee is the main subsidiary organ of the Economic and
Social Council and the UNGA for planning, programming, and coordination. For more information see: www.un.org/en/ga/cpc/about.
shtml
7
The existing UNEP Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF) has universal “participation” and meets on an annual basis. Moving to
universal membership and a three- to four-year cycle could also result in savings. The IUCN World Conservation Congress now meets once
every four years, with its 2008 meeting attracting 6,600 participants.
8
Joint meetings would not be a new precedent. A recent UNDP Executive Board meeting has included a joint segment bringing together UN
Women, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, and UNOPS.
9
The fact that 42 entities across the system have environment programs is a success. However, there is no one overarching framework
against which multiple inputs can be measured or through which programmatic overlaps or gaps can be assessed. Lessons can be learned
from past practice and from the recent Strategic Plan for Biodiversity and Aichi Biodiversity Targets adopted at CBD COP 10 that seek to
speak systemwide. For a brief history, see, for example: www.cites.org/eng/news/SG/2011/20110909_SG_IISD_art.php
10
Noting that “synergies” should also be considered from the programmatic, financing, and the UN systemwide (and beyond) perspective, as
is addressed elsewhere in this brief. See also: www.cites.org/eng/news/SG/2012/20120221_UNEP-GMEF.php
11
If meeting simultaneously, non-parties to any MEA would remain as observers, similar to what occurs with CBD and its protocols (and as
has occurred at the simultaneous COPs of the chemicals and waste conventions).
12
Such a role could be achieved through the governing body with universal membership, the systemwide plan, an enhanced GEO, the CEB/
EMG (and role of BLG, etc. within the EMG), etc. – see above.
13
The issues of climate change and ozone (and the Multilateral Fund) may need to be addressed differently.
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